Lagging CIA-Run Resupply Called Factor in Slow Progress of Contras

TEGUCIGALPA, Honduras — A CIA-run military resupply operation is behind schedule in making air drops to the contras fighting the Sandinista regime inside Nicaragua and may be contributing to the insurgency’s slow progress on the battlefield, rebel and diplomatic sources say.

Delays in getting munitions and other supplies to the guerrillas in the field are largely the result of a shortage of airplanes and pilots trained to make the dangerous flights over Nicaraguan territory, the sources said. American pilots are prohibited from flying into Nicaragua, and one source said that the contras have contracted other pilots to supplement their own people.

In a series of recent interviews, the rebels also noted other supply problems, such as a shortage of secure field radios. Rebel commanders complained about irregular shipments of U.S.-supplied uniforms and said that many of the jungle boots purchased with U.S. aid wore out too quickly.

Meanwhile, the commanders said they have received more than ample supplies of toothpaste, anti-fungal foot cream and hospital bedpans.

Plenty of Foot Cream

“We have enough foot cream for all of the armies of Central America,” said a commander of the Nicaraguan Democratic Force, the largest contra faction.

The CIA was authorized to resume direction of contras activities Oct. 18 when President Reagan signed legislation approving $100 million in military and economic aid to the insurgency.

In addition to problems with the supply network, the CIA has had trouble asserting its influence over military operations, according to a Western official with access to intelligence information.

“They would like to do the targeting,” said the official, speaking on condition that he not be identified. “But the FDN (Nicaraguan Democratic Force) says, ‘You’re not doing well in logistics, then don’t try to tell us what to do with the stuff once we’ve got it.’ ”

At least two CIA agents are stationed at the contras’ command base in southern Honduras. The supply operation is run from the Swan Islands, a Honduran possession in the Caribbean Sea, and from Aguacate, a Honduras air base long used by the contras for air supply.

Leaders of the Nicaraguan Democratic Force were reluctant to criticize the CIA supply operation, possibly because the agency has backed their faction in an internal power conflict with rival contra factions. But at least half a dozen rebel and diplomatic sources privately discussed the supply problem, and Enrique Bermudez, the force’s chief military officer, acknowledged them in general.

Supplies Called Key

“The course of the war is determined by how well the troops are supplied. If we can resupply the troops, the pressure (on the Sandinistas) will be very great. If we can’t resupply them, the war will go more slowly,” Bermudez said.

He said that supplies were arriving “little by little” and that, on the military front, “I am satisfied with what we have accomplished with the resources we have received.”

At least 200 rebels have graduated from a six-week U.S. Special Forces training course since the new aid was approved, and others are expected to attend the course in the United States.

The contras claim to have 11,000 troops inside Nicaragua, the majority of them having infiltrated in the last few months, carrying new U.S. supplies with them.

Maj. Gen. Joaquin Cuadra, chief of staff of the Sandinista Popular Army, said in a brief interview in Managua that 4,000 rebels are in the country--far fewer than the contras’ estimate but more than the Sandinistas have previously admitted.

Both sides say there is increased fighting and casualties. Bermudez said his troops engage in 40 to 50 military actions a week. Into February, those actions included blowing up two electricity towers that blacked out three northern Nicaraguan provinces for nearly a week, and, according to the rebels, the shooting down of a Sandinista helicopter with a U.S.-supplied surface-to-air missile.

But so far, the rebels have not shown the spectacular military successes that some U.S. officials and contra leaders predicted last fall after the new aid was approved. Some had said that the rebels would carry out heavy economic sabotage and dramatic commando raids by early this year and possibly even seize and occupy a piece of Nicaraguan territory.

More recently, however, the contras have tried to lower expectations for flashy military action with a report saying that their strategy is for gradual and incremental warfare and that it is not feasible for them to hold territory against the larger and better-equipped Sandinista army. Last week, Gen. John R. Galvin, head of the Panama-based U.S. Southern Command, told Congress that it would be three to seven years before the contras could gain the upper hand.

Some U.S. officials now are signaling late spring or summer for high-visibility attacks--about the time that Congress is expected to be debating a Reagan Administration request for an additional $105 million in aid to the contras for fiscal 1988.

“Many people have said we should just go in and deal a spectacular blow,” said a contras commander. “Well, we’re not going to put up thousands of dead just for the U.S. Congress.”

The commanders interviewed said that the rebels are in the process of forming clandestine support groups and commando units and are gathering intelligence on potential targets for sabotage. They said that the reliability of supply deliveries will determine whether they can keep up sustained military pressure on the Sandinistas and will make or break their military plan.

“In the past, we had plans, but we were making them in the air because we didn’t have the materials. . . . If we don’t resupply the troops by March, some of them will have to come out,” the commander said. Some troops are as far as a month’s trek from the Honduran border.

The commander said that the contras’ ability to attract new recruits also depends on adequate supplies of food and weapons.

“The biggest problem is the lack of airplanes and pilots,” one commander explained.

The rebels declined to discuss specifics of their air supply system. The contras are known to have only one functioning DC-6 supply plane. Bermudez said they lost a C-47 supply plane to mechanical failure last October, and it is known that a Spanish-made, twin-engine airplane being used to supply the rebels crashed into the ocean near the Swan Islands in December.

The rebels need about two dozen flights per month to keep their troops supplied with arms and food inside Nicaragua. Sources said they have carried out only about half of that. A Western diplomat said the supply flights were “a month behind schedule,” adding, “That is not fatal.”

One Air Drop Intercepted

Sandinista troops intercepted one contras supply drop last month in the central Nicaraguan province of Zelaya. The drop included weapons, ammunition, explosives, boots and Nicaraguan currency. The Sandinistas claim to have had intelligence information about the flight, but rebel and diplomatic sources attributed the interception to error by the drop pilot.

The sources generally discounted Nicaragua’s anti-aircraft defense system as a major obstacle to the supply flights but said that Sandinista troops sometimes are able to keep the contras on the run so they cannot meet their suppliers. The Sandinistas have Soviet-made SAM-7 and SAM-14 anti-aircraft missiles. They also have portable radar units, which, however, they are reported to be using inexpertly.

Last October, Sandinista soldiers shot down a rebel supply plane over Nicaragua and captured its American cargo handler, Eugene Hasenfus. The event brought to light the existence of a U.S.-supported clandestine supply network, operating at a time when U.S. military help to the contras was banned, and has since helped to uncover aspects of the Iran-contras scandal.

Several contra leaders said they believe the Iran-contra controversy is contributing to their current supply problem, and they complained about red tape in the U.S. procurement system. One rebel source cited an instance last November when the rebels sought to purchase a spare part for a vehicle in Honduras. The source said that U.S. officials required three bids on the item, for which there was only one supplier in the country.

“Even though all of this is legal, the eyes of Congress and the General Accounting Office are on us so that there is no impropriety. . . . Everyone is proceeding with great caution not to commit any errors,” the rebel said.

The caution may be too little, too late in the wake of the Iran-contra scandal. The Democratic-controlled Congress is believed to be leaning against further aid to the contras.

Some Supplies Shoddy

Rebel commanders said that some of the supplies bought with money from the $100 million appropriated for this fiscal year have been shoddy. One lot of boots wore out in a week, one source said.

“We get pants and no shirts, or shirts and no pants. It is bad coordination,” a rebel commander said.

One rebel official involved with supplies, however, said the overall picture is not as bad as the commanders felt.

“Out of 20,000 pairs of boots, maybe there’s a problem with 800 pairs. . . . I don’t consider that a serious problem. Before (the CIA took over) we had problems with 50% of the boots,” he said.

He blamed manufacturers rather than the CIA for late deliveries of some items and noted that all of the rebels who have infiltrated into Nicaragua went fully equipped. He said he believed more field radios were to be delivered over this weekend.

The rebel official said that while the contras were waiting for military supplies after Reagan signed last fall’s $100-million aid package, they received excessive shipments of hospital bedpans, toothpaste and anti-fungal cream, which they believe were bought with funds from the $27 million in so-called non-lethal U.S. aid approved by Congress for the contras in fiscal 1986.

Another source close to the contras insisted that those supplies were donations that had been sitting in U.S. warehouses. He said they were delivered to the contras under the U.S. aid program during the “lag time” after the $100 million legislation was signed and before military purchases could be made.

One rebel supply official said that tens of thousands of tubes of toothpaste turned out to be a good thing. “In some places in Nicaragua, they’re as good as money because of the shortages there,” he said.